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SUDHA SETTY*

Country Report on Counterterrorism:
United States of America†
TOPIC V. A
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led to profound
changes in societal viewpoints, political agendas, and the legal au
thorization to combat terrorism. The United States continues to
struggle with keeping its population safe while maintaining the prin
ciples of democracy and the rule of law essential to the nation’s
character. The U.S. response to terrorism has been multifaceted and
expansive, reflective of the U.S. role in global security; debate over
these matters will continue for the foreseeable future.
This report offers summary, analysis and critique of many as
pects of counterterrorism law, including the definition of terrorism
and designation of terrorist organizations; application of interna
tional law; criminal law treatment of terrorism, including financing
and material support; investigative powers of intelligence and law en
forcement agencies; treatment of immigrants; executive power and the
CIA targeted killing program; detention and interrogation of terror
ism suspects; and access to courts and the treatment of classified
information.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which killed almost
3,000 civilians, led to profound changes in societal viewpoints, politi
cal agendas, and the legal authority to combat terrorism and threats
of terrorism. The United States, like all other democratic nations that
have suffered terrorist attacks, continues to struggle with questions
of how to keep its population safe while maintaining the principles of
democracy and the rule of law that are essential to the nation’s
character.
* Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Intellectual Life and Professor of
Law, Western New England University School of Law. The author thanks Matthew
H. Charity and Lauren Carasik for thoughtful comments and suggestions, and Kelly
Heuser for fine research assistance.
† DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5131/AJCL.2013.0039
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In the twelve years since the attacks of September 11, Congress,
the executive branch and the judicial system have reacted strongly to
the need to protect against future national security threats by giving
more powers to the police, military, and intelligence forces to investi
gate potential threats and neutralize them before another attack
occurs. Some of the these changes occurred in response to U.N. Secur
ity Council resolutions,1 but many have been domestically motivated
shifts that reflect the will of politicians and the polity as a whole. The
expanded powers accorded to these counterterrorism programs
have—in the view of many critics—allowed for government infringe
ment on civil liberties and human rights in significant and corrosive
ways, with little or no accountability for such overreaching.
In the years immediately following the attacks of September 11,
the Bush administration asserted both inherent presidential author
ity and broad powers conferred under the Authorization for the Use
of Military Force2 and the USA Patriot Act.3 The government con
ducted warrantless wiretapping surveillance, detained thousands of
individuals—almost all of whom were Muslim—who were later re
leased based on lack of evidence of any connection to terrorism,
conducted extraordinary renditions to capture and transport sus
pected individuals from one country to another without judicial
oversight, and resorted to torture as an interrogation and control
technique on some detainees.
Some of these issues were eventually resolved—through public
pressure, judicial intervention and/or a change in political
branches—in ways that improved the individual rights of detainees,
suspects and the public. Yet robust presidential authority and ex
tremely high levels of secrecy continue to be the norm, and the
nation’s policymakers still struggle with how best to maintain secur
ity, accountability, and the rule of law.
II. THE DEFINITION

OF

TERRORISM

Terrorism is defined in numerous ways under U.S. law, but con
tains several basic elements: premeditation, political or religious
motivation, perpetration of violence, noncombatant targets, and ac
1. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 has played a strong role worldwide in
developing a concerted counterterrorism effort. The United States played a significant
role in supporting the language and passage of Resolution 1373 and encouraging its
worldwide mandate. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Other People’s Patriot Acts: Europe’s
Response to September 11, 50 LOY. L. REV. 89, 91–92 (2004).
2. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. 107-40, codified at
115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001).
3. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
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tors as subnational groups or clandestine agents.4 The United States
has not made any exceptions to this definition based on the activity
being expressive in character or with regard to national liberation
struggles.5
The USA PATRIOT Act, passed in the weeks immediately follow
ing the September 11 attacks, offers both greater counterterrorism
resources and more flexibility in implementation to the government,
including increased surveillance powers,6 increased government au
thority to conduct intelligence-gathering operations in matters of
suspected terrorism,7 the power of civil seizure of assets based only
on probable cause,8 and heightened punishments for any of the un
derlying crimes related to the newly broadened understanding of
“domestic terrorism,” which includes:
[A]cts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State [that] ap
pear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; to influence the policy of a government by intimi
dation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government
by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occur
primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.9
This definition of domestic terrorism was the result of intense pres
sure on Congress10 to amend various existing criminal statutes to
4. E.g., 22 U.S.C.A. § 2656f(2)(d) (2) (WEST) (defining terrorism for the purpose
of the State Department’s annual report to the Speaker of the House and the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations as “premeditated, politically motivated violence per
petrated against noncombatants by subnational groups or clandestine agents”); see
Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering And Combating The Fi
nancing of Terrorism: United States of America, (Financial Action Task Force, Paris,
France) June 2006, at 40, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/u-z/united
states/documents/mutualevaluationoftheunitedstates.html (offering similar elements
of a definition of terrorism for the purposes of evaluation under the Immigration and
Nationality Act [Title 8 USC 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)]).
5. See Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name: How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years
After 9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011).
6. See Patriot Act § 218 (amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 such that electronic surveillance and physical searches need only be justified in
“significant” part by the goal of obtaining foreign intelligence).
7. Patriot Act § 901.
8. Patriot Act § 806.
9. Patriot Act § 802. Critics of this broad definition have noted that such lan
guage could encompass numerous activist groups, including Greenpeace, protestors of
the World Trade Organization, Operation Rescue, and protesters of bomb-testing fa
cilities on the island of Vieques. See How the USA PATRIOT Act redefines “Domestic
Terrorism,” AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 6, 2002), http://www.aclu.org/national
security/how-usa-patriot-act-redefines-domesticterrorism.
10. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS
AND LIBERTY 11 (2008) (arguing that the legislative role in safeguarding civil liberties
is hampered by political imperatives).
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broaden and strengthen the government’s resources before another
attack potentially took place.11
The Patriot Act amended the definition of terrorism from 18
U.S.C. § 2331 to broaden its scope and application further,12 but in
cluded an important sunset provision—added in part because of the
haste with which the legislation was passed—that forced Congress to
reexamine the legislation at intervals of several years.13 Although
Congress debated the renewal of certain parts of the Patriot Act in
2005—none of which involved the definition of terrorism—in March
2006, Congress renewed most provisions, removed the safeguard of a
sunset provision, and made the provisions permanent.14
The current Patriot Act definition of terrorism has a broad scope,
and its reach exacerbates the uncertainty surrounding the applica
tion of conflicting definitions of terrorism, including the potential
lack of notice to individuals as to whether they will be categorized as
a terrorist and exactly what kind of conduct is prohibited.15
III. CRIMINAL LAWS

AND

PROSECUTIONS

A. Criminal Law
Terrorist acts are often prosecuted using the ordinary criminal
justice system, particularly when the alleged crime occurred domesti
cally. Statutes such as the Anti-Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA)16 and the Patriot Act were enacted as specific responses to
11. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Six Weeks in Autumn, WASHINGTON POST MAGA
Oct. 27, 2002, at 6, 10 (describing the pressured deliberations of Congress and
the executive branch in drafting the Patriot Act).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (including “mass destruction” as a means by which ter
rorists operate).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (commenting that Section 801 of Pub. L 90-351 provided
a sunset provision for various counterterrorism tools, including those related to wire
tapping and surveillance).
14. See JAMES BECKMAN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO HOMELAND SECUR
ITY AND ANTI-TERRORISM 31 (2007) (describing how sunset provisions were adopted,
extended, and then removed). Only three provisions not dealing with the definition of
terrorism were still kept subject to the sunset provisions. Id. Those provisions were
extended in May 2011 until 2015. See Paul Kane & Felicia Somnez, Patriot Act
Amendments Signed into Law Despite Bipartisan Resistance from Congress,
WASHPOST.COM, May 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/patriot-act-ex
tension-signed-into-law-despite-bipartisan-resistance-incongress/2011/05/27/AGbVls
CH_story.html (describing the extension of surveillance provisions of the Patriot Act).
15. See SUBCOMM. ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SEC. & HOUSE PERMANENT SE
LECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 107TH CONG., COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES AND
PERFORMANCE PRIOR TO 9-11: A REPORT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENT
ATIVES AND THE MINORITY LEADER (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
2002_rpt/hpsci_ths0702.html (reviewing alternative ways to combat terrorism in or
der to prevent future attacks). The Subcommittee’s recommendation that a single
definition of terrorism be agreed upon by all U.S. agencies was predicated on a con
cern that a lack of uniform definition would lead to terrorist acts being treated
identically under the law as ordinary criminal acts. Id.
16. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1217 (codified in scatter sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
ZINE,
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terrorist acts and to enable investigation and prosecution of activities
that were not previously criminalized.
A serious constitutional issue has been raised with regard to a
number of U.S. statutes that criminalize speech-related conduct that
supports or encourages violent acts, including terrorist acts. The fed
eral criminal solicitation17 and sedition statutes,18 for example,
authorize such prosecution. However, the most widely used statute in
this area criminalizes material support of terrorism. Sections 2339A
and 2339B of Title 18 of the U.S. Code prohibit knowingly or inten
tionally providing, attempting to provide, or conspiring to provide
material support or resources to a terrorist organization, defining the
term “material support or resources” to include:
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, fi
nancial services, lodging, training, expert advice or
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identifica
tion, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who
may be or include oneself), and transportation, except
medicine or religious materials.19
Material support charges have been used extensively to try terrorism
suspects or to exert pressure toward a plea bargain, and are often
successful.20 Unlike other crimes often invoked to prosecute terror
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) (criminalizing solicitation of crimes). See also Letter
from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolu
tion 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the
Security Council, (June 15, 2006), Enclosure: Response of the United States of
America to the Counter-Terrorism Committee: United States implementation of Se
curity Council resolution 1624 (2005), at 5-6, available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.
org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/395/24/PDF/N0639524.pdf?OpenElement (hereinaf
ter “U.S. CTC Response 2006”) (citing the availability of 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b) (acts of
terrorism, such as murder, maiming, or kidnapping, transcending national bounda
ries), 18 U.S.C. § 2332f (bombings of places of public use), and 49 U.S.C. § 46502
(aircraft piracy) in prosecuting support of terrorism).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2384 prohibits seditious conspiracy (plotting to use force to over
throw the government). 18 U.S.C. § 2385 proscribes teaching or advocating the duty
or necessity of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States by
force or violence; publishing or circulating literature which so teaches or advocates;
joining or organizing any group which so teaches or advocates, knowing the purposes
thereof; or conspiring to do any of the foregoing. See U.S. CTC Response 2006, supra
note 17 (discussing the availability of these statutes in the counterterrorism context);
U.S. v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 116-117 (2nd Cir. 1999) (upholding the solicitation con
viction of Sheik Omar Amad Ali Abdel Rahman based on his exhortations for others to
bomb New York City facilities and to assassinate certain persons).
19. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.
20. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Minneapolis,
Minneapolis Man Sentenced for Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Qaeda,
(July 9, 2009), http://minneapolis.fbi.gov/dojpressreVpressreI09/mp070909.htm (last
visited Oct. 19,2010) (describing the guilty plea of Mohammed Abdullah Warsame to
charges of material support for al Qaeda, which resulted in a prison sentence of
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suspects, such as continuing criminal enterprise21 and violations of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act22 which re
quire at least some predicate act for criminal liability to attach,23 the
material support statute does not require the defendant to have had
a specific intent to support a terrorist act; knowing support of a desig
nated terrorist organization without intent is sufficient to convict.24
The scope and flexibility offered by the material support statute has
made it an often-used tool for prosecutors and was used to convict
John Walker Lindh,25 Ahmed Omar Abu Ali,26 and the so-called
“Lackawanna Six,”27 among others.
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the statute does
not unconstitutionally infringe on the expressive rights of individu
als.28 In some respects, this decision promoted additional uncertainty
as to what individuals and organizations will be prosecuted under the
material support statute, and on what basis.29 The United States
government maintains, however, that the majority of the terrorist
propaganda found on the Internet today could not be prosecuted
under U.S. criminal law, and that even a website advocating commit
ting acts of terrorist violence likely lacks (at least without proof of
additional facts) the potential to produce imminent lawless action
that could be criminalized.30
B. Terrorism Prosecutions
The United States has historically shied away from specialized
trials for terrorist attacks, instead relying on the criminal justice sys
ninety-two months); Philip Coorey, Hicks Case Flawed All Along; Prosecutor, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.smh.com.auJarticlesI2008/04/29/1209
234862811.htrnl (last visited Oct. 19,2010) (detailing David Hicks’ guilty plea to ma
terial support charges).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2008).
22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
23. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2008) (defining racketeering as involving at
least two acts in furtherance of the illegal plan).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(I) (2000).
25. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002) (entering guilty
plea in violation of, among other things, the material support statute).
26. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1312 (2009).
27. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney, W. Dist. of N.Y., United
States Attorney’s Office Successfully Concludes Terrorism Case With Sixth Convic
tion of AI Qaeda Supporter (May 19, 2003) (announcing the conviction of Muhktar alBakri).
28. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
29. See Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Hybrid Scrutiny, Safe Harbors, and
Freedom of Speech 63 Hastings L.J. 455, 498 (2011) (arguing that the majority opin
ion failed to specify how much coordination with a foreign terrorist organization
would lead to a violation of the federal statute prohibiting material support to these
organizations).
30. U.S. CTC Response 2006, supra note 17, at 4-5.
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tem.31 In part, this policy is intended to affirm the rule of law in the
United States and to maintain the United States’ reputation in the
international community for fairness toward criminal defendants32
regardless of the crime committed or the national origin or religion of
the defendant.33
One critique of the criminal justice system with regard to terror
ism prosecutions has been the de facto unavailability of the
entrapment defense. In evaluating an entrapment defense, most
courts will consider whether the defendant was induced into illegal
acts by law enforcement or had, to the contrary, a predisposition to
commit the crime even if law enforcement had not intervened. In the
context of a terrorism prosecution, a defendant’s predisposition to
ward terrorist acts is often inferred from the defendant’s political and
religious views, or sympathies toward those of the same political bent
or religious background who have engaged in terrorist activities.34 In
the post-9/11 context, there has not been one publicly known instance
of a successful entrapment defense in a terrorism case,35 despite am
ple evidence of law enforcement inducing defendants toward illegal
activities.36
Since September 2001, numerous alternative venues to criminal
trials have been proposed and sometimes used. The creation of a spe
cialized national security court has been advocated by some on the
political left and right as a means to professionalize and depoliticize
the process of adjudicating terrorism trials while also protecting the
classification of secret documents.37 However, such proposals have
31. Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials for Terrorism, 63
ME. L. REV. 131 (2010).
32. This reputation for a justice system with exceptionally strong protections for
defendants is open to critique. See James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the
War on Crime Helped Make the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc.
Change 331, 337 (2009) (“we hav[e] one of the most punitive systems in the world
while believing we have one of the most liberal”).
33. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE CASE AGAINST A SPECIAL TERRORISM COURT 3 (2009)
(“Unjust detentions and trials at Guantanamo have fueled animosity toward the
United States. These decisions also have undermined U.S. efforts to advance the rule
of law around the world, which is critical to confronting the threat of terrorism. Creat
ing a special terrorism court . . . would perpetuate these errors”).
34. Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 698-711
(2010).
35. See CTR. ON LAW & SECURITY, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL RE
PORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2011, 26 (2011) available at http://
www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/TTRC%20Ten%20Year%20Issue.pdf.
36. See Paul Harris, Fake terror plots, paid informants: the tactics of FBI ‘entrap
ment’ questioned, theguardian.com, Nov. 16, 2011, available at http://www.theguard
ian.com/world/2011/nov/16/fbi-entrapment-fake-terror-plots (arguing that the FBI
has concocted terrorism plots, lured and enabled individuals to participate and then
arrested them in order to justify the expansion of the government’s counterterrorism
powers).
37. See Jack Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, The Terrorists’ Court, nytimes.com,
July 11, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/opinion/11katyal.html
?_r=0.
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been met with concern and have not been implemented. The Bush
administration made a decision soon after September 2001 to use
military commissions to try those who were designated by the admin
istration as “enemy combatants.” The military commission system
has been through several iterations in the intervening twelve years,
but relatively few defendants have actually been tried in this
system.38
C. Punishment of Terrorism
Prior to the passage of the AEDPA in 1996, sentencing for crimes
involving terrorism fell within the range dictated under ordinary
criminal law, since defendants usually faced charges based on violent
criminal activity, regardless of any political motivations. Upon the
passage of the Patriot Act, Congress authorized enhancements to the
sentencing for numerous terrorism-related crimes.39 As a result,
sentences for such crimes increased significantly, even in situations
where there was no direct link to an act of violence, such as material
support for terrorism.40 The existence of a terrorism sentencing en
hancement also serves as a statutory basis for appellate courts to
overturn sentences as too lenient, as has occurred in high-profile
prosecutions, such as those of Ahmad Abu Ali, Lynne Stewart, and
Jose Padilla.41
IV. INVESTIGATIVE POWERS
A. Police Powers
The USA PATRIOT Act and other legislation in the post-9/11
context increased the powers of federal law enforcement authorities
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This has led to
increased surveillance and investigation, as well as a significant
number of arrests of alleged terrorists. The government has main
tained that its efforts have prevent planned terrorist acts from
occurring42 and has elicited valuable counterterrorism and intelli
gence information as part of the interrogation, negotiation, and plea
bargain process.43 The federal material witness statute, which em
38. See Part IX.A, infra, for a discussion of the U.S. military commission system.
39. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Appendix A (sentencing
table) (2011).
40. The penalty for conviction is a sentence of up to fifteen years in prison, rising
to life in prison if the material support results in death. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
41. See United States v. Stewart, 686 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v.
Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008).
42. See, e.g., Sarah Kershaw, Terrorist in ‘99 U.S. Case is Sentenced to 22 Years,
N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2005), http://query.nytimes.com/gstlfullpage.htrn1?res=9A07
E7DCI03FF93BAI5754COA9639C8B63 (describing the detention of Ahmed Ressam
two weeks prior to the execution of his planned attack).
43. See Jeff Zeleny & Charlie Savage, Official Says Terrorism Suspect is Cooper
ating, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A11 (noting that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
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powers the government to detain and question individuals without
charge44 has enhanced the ability of law enforcement to detain indi
viduals with potentially relevant information for terrorism
prosecutions, but it has also increased the potential for abuse of dis
cretion and abuse of executive power.45
For most46 covert counterterrorism-related surveillance, the FBI
is obligated to follow requirements under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) to seek judicial approval from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Under FISA, law enforce
ment officials must meet the standard of probable cause to garner a
warrant for surveillance, a standard that the government meets in
almost all cases.47 Law enforcement officers must undertake a mini
mization process by which they attempt to ensure that individuals
and communications that are not targets of investigation are ex
cluded from surveillance.48 Much of the information garnered
pursuant to a FISC warrant is usable in court. FISA has been
amended several times since its enactment in 1978, with the most
recent amendments in 2008 allowing for broader surveillance author
ity and immunizing telecommunications companies that work with
law enforcement to enable surveillance from civil liability.49
The FBI’s police powers have also generated a high level of scru
tiny of immigrant populations within the United States. The lowered
due process protections accorded to immigrants allow for a more
searching and a less privacy-protective approach. Lawyers cite the
presence of FBI agents during immigration proceedings, Immigration
and Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) reliance on statements made in old
FBI interviews in its decisions, and the FBI’s submission of prejudi
arrested in conjunction with his alleged attempt to use explosives on a United Statesbound airline flight on December 25, 2009, cooperated with law enforcement and of
fered valuable information pertaining to al-Qaeda).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
45. The government used the material witness statute broadly after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, arresting hundreds of people and detaining them for
up to several months. See. e.g., al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009);
Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
46. National Security Letters, used over 100,000 times by the Bush administra
tion, circumvented judicial oversight altogether. Instead, they were subpoenas by the
FBI seeking information on a target from third parties such as banks or employers,
while implementing a gag order on the recipients of the subpoenas. See generally
Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Secur
ity Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (2013).
47. See David Kravets, Domestic Surveillance Court Approved All 1,506 Warrant
Applications in 2010, wired.com, May 6, 2011, available at http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2011/05/domestic-surveillance/.
48. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2006) (directing the use of minimization proce
dures to “minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of
nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons”).
49. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub.L. 110-261 (enacted July 10, 2008).
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cial affidavits raising national security concerns without providing
the basis of the allegations. FBI agents have used the structural
power imbalances inherent in the immigration processes to coerce
Muslim immigrants into becoming informants, or retaliate if they
refuse.50
State and local police agencies have worked on counterterrorism
issues, often in conjunction with federal law enforcement agencies.
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)51 are arrangements in which a
local police department assigns a number of officers to work on a ter
rorism-related task force with FBI agents;52 federal agents offer
access to powerful investigative tools, whereas police departments of
fer local knowledge and engagement in community policing.53 Over
one hundred American cities participate in JTTFs,54 despite occa
sional concerns that the JTTFs engage in unconstitutional racial and
religious profiling.55 Municipalities like New York City have engaged
in expansive counterterrorism work in the post-9/11 years that has
raised significant concerns as the infringement of civil liberties.56 Fu
sion centers are state and local entities meant to enhance the ability
of the federal government to garner and synthesize information from
local communities,57 but have been criticized for undermining civil
liberties and wasting taxpayer funds.58
50. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. AND
EDUC. FUND, UNDER THE RADAR: MUSLIMS DEPORTED, DETAINED, AND DENIED ON UN
SUBSTANTIATED TERRORISM ALLEGATIONS 8 (2011), available at http://aaldef.org/
UndertheRadar.pdf.
51. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Protecting America from Terrorist At
tack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, fbi.com, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about
us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs (describing the role and structure of JTTFs).
52. See Tung Yin, Joint Terrorism Task Forces as a Window into the Security vs.
Civil Liberties Debate, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 3 (2012); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTI
GATION, BOSTON JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
(2006), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/spyfiles/ma_attachment3_attach_
MSP&FBI2.pdf.
53. See James Forman, Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9 (2004). For a cogent critique of the use of community policing
in the counterterrorism context, see Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Commu
nity, forthcoming Harvard National Security Journal (Fall 2013), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2222083.
54. See Protecting America from Terrorist Attack, supra note 51.
55. See William Yardley, Portland, Ore., Votes to Rejoin Task Force After Terror
ism Scare, nytimes.com, Apr. 30, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/
01/us/01portland.html?_r=2&ref=us& (visited Sept. 27, 2013) (describing the civil lib
erties concerns behind the temporary refusal of Portland, Oregon to work with the
FBI as part of a JTTF).
56. See generally Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, ENEMIES WITHIN: INSIDE THE
NYPD’S SECRET SPYING UNIT AND BIN LADEN’S FINAL PLOT AGAINST AMERICA (2013)
(offering evidence of systematic religious profiling and discrimination by the New
York City Police Department’s counterterrorism unit).
57. See Department of Homeland Security, State and Major Urban Area Fusion
Centers, available at http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers.
58. See Senators Carl Levin and Tom Coburn, Federal Support for and Involve
ment in State and Local Fusion Centers, United States Senate Permanent
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B. Intelligence Agencies
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security
Agency (NSA), the leading intelligence-gathering organizations for
the U.S. government, have operated with much greater latitude in
the post-9/11 era than previously.59 The CIA has worked extensively
to capture, detain and interrogate suspected terrorists abroad. It op
erated various secret detention facilities, known as “black sites,”
throughout the world to accomplish this goal, prompting criticism
from international and domestic groups that people were being disap
peared by the CIA.60 In 2009, the use of those black sites was
curtailed by President Obama.61
In the post-9/11 era, the NSA has, among other programs, allo
cated tremendous energy and resources to massive data collection of
electronic communications of U.S. and foreign persons.62 The NSA
defends its collection of telephone call metadata and electronic com
munications based on the FISC’s interpretation of section 215 of the
Patriot Act. The FISC has created a nonpublic body of law that has
allowed the NSA to amass the metadata (time, location, duration,
and other information not containing content) for all domestic and
some international phone calls.63 From June 2013 onward, as details
of the breadth and depth of the NSA’s surveillance programs con
tinue to leak to the public,64 questions have arisen as to whether the
scope of NSA’s surveillance is an unconstitutional intrusion into the
privacy of U.S. citizens, whether congressional oversight of the NSA
Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmen
tal Affairs, Oct. 3, 2012.
59. The CIA is prohibited from conducting surveillance within U.S. borders. See
Executive Order 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981); National Security Act of
1947. However, the CIA has justified its surveillance within the U.S. by focusing its
efforts on foreign targets that have contact with domestic sources, as well as as
signing CIA officers on unpaid leave to work on domestic efforts. See Inspector
General David B. Buckley, Review of CIA-NYPD Relationship, Dec. 27, 2011, availa
ble at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/717864-cia-nypd-ig.html).
60. See Dafna Linzer and Julie Tate, New Light Shed on CIA’s ‘Black Site’ Pris
ons, washpost.com, Feb. 28, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
dyn/content/article/2007/02/27/AR2007022702214.html (visited Sept. 27, 2013).
61. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
62. Timothy B. Lee, Here’s everything we know about PRISM to date, washpost.
com, June 12, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date/ (visited Sept. 27, 2013).
63. Jennifer Valentino-Devries and Siobhan Gorman, Secret Court’s Redefinition
of ‘Relevant’ Empowered Vast NSA Data-Gathering, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2013, availa
ble at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873238739045785718937588533
44.html.
64. Former CIA contractor Edward Snowden began disclosing numerous aspects
of NSA surveillance practices in June 2013. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting
phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, theguardian.com, June 5, 2013,
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-veri
zon-court-order.
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must be strengthened,65 and whether the FISC provides an effective
mechanism to curb potential abuse by the NSA.66
These debates continue to be robust, largely due to the impact of
these counterterrorism programs on a vast swath of the U.S. public
and because of the seeming inability of the public to understand the
program and curtail it. This frustration stems from the secrecy sur
rounding the program, Congress’s inability to disclose the extent of
its knowledge to the public or exercise substantial oversight, FISC
not being able to take an adversarial position with regard to govern
ment assurances of the necessity of such surveillance, and the extent
of NSA access to the data stored by telecommunications companies,
even without their consent.67 In response to the public debate, task
forces were convened to examine the scope and legality of the NSA’s
work.68 As of early 2014, Congress and the administration continue
to weigh various options for reforming both intelligence-gathering
and storage policies, as well as oversight and accountability
measures.69

65. See Spencer Ackerman, Intelligence committee withheld key file before critical
NSA vote, Amash claims, guardian.com, Aug. 12, 2013, available at http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash (not
ing that congressional leaders had not shared the relevant information with their
colleagues prior to voting for Patriot Act reauthorization).
66. See Carol D. Leonnig, Court: Ability to police U.S. spying program is limited,
washingtonpost.com, Aug. 15, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/court-ability-to-police-us-spying-program-limited/2013/08/15/4a8c8c44-05cd-1
1e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html (citing U.S. district judge Reggie Walton and not
ing that “the court lacks the tools to independently verify how often the government’s
surveillance breaks the court’s rules . . . [and] it also cannot check the veracity of the
government’s assertions that the violations its staff members report are unintentional
mistakes”).
67. See Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson and Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic
Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1 (discussing NSA ef
forts to make encryption software vulnerable, and noting that much of this activity
has been sanctioned by the FISC).
68. See Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone
Records Program Conducted Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the
Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Jan. 23, 2014, available at
http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/default/PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-Rec
ords-Program.pdf (concluding that some aspects of the NSA’s surveillance program
were likely illegal); President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies, Liberty and Security in a Changing World, Dec. 12, 2013, available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf
(recommending some changes to the NSA’s data collection and storage procedures).
69. President Obama has spoken out on the importance of the NSA’s work in de
veloping actionable intelligence, as well as the need to revisit the question of
limitations on the NSA’s collection and storage of data. See President Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence, whitehouse.gov, Jan. 17,
2014, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks
president-review-signals-intelligence (visited Feb. 26, 2014).
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TERRORIST GROUPS/INDIVIDUALS

A. Proscription Mechanisms
The ability of the Secretary of State to designate “foreign terror
ist organizations” (FTOs) as such for the purposes of prohibiting
material support, increasing surveillance and freezing financial as
sets has been an important tool for U.S. counterterrorism efforts.70 In
particular, U.S. law provides that incitement to commit a terrorist
act (under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or
serious bodily injury) is a basis for designating a group as either an
FTO71 or as a terrorist organization for immigration purposes.72
Even if a group has not been formally designated as an FTO, if the
requisite incitement standard is met, that automatically triggers
treatment as a terrorist organization for immigration purposes.73 Ob
servers suggest that the FTOs fall into one of two categories: those
that genuinely threaten the national security of the United States in
a direct way, and those that challenge the foreign relations or eco
nomic interests of the United States.74
Under the AEDPA, a specific process must be undertaken to des
ignate an organization as an FTO.75 It is a process that is open to
critique as being insufficiently rights-protective, but also incorpo
rates some safeguards against abuse.76 Once the FTO designation
has been made by the State Department, limited procedural safe
guards are available, after which the designation is finalized.77
70. U.S. 2006 CTC Report, supra note 17, at 8.
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1189.
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) (provided that other relevant legal criteria are
met).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).
74. Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND.
L.J. 543, 568 (2011).
75. See AEDPA §§ 219(a)(1)(A)-(C), 219(a)(2)(C) (codified in 8 USC §1189(a))
(finding that anyone who interacts with FTOs is violating the statute, and authoriz
ing the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the assets of entities designated as FTOs);
Exec. Order No. 12,947, 3 C.F.R. 319 (1995) (establishing authority for the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of the Treasury to limit property rights of designated ter
rorists). See also Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2002) (finding it necessary to
utilize financial sanctions against foreign terrorists).
76. See AEDPA § 219(a) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)) (establishing both the
procedure used for designation as a terrorist organization as well as congressional
and judicial means available to pursue designations review and revocation); see also
Julie B. Shapiro, The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organiza
tions: The Effect on Separation of Powers, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 547,
556–58 (2008) (arguing that the designation process contravenes due process
guarantees).
77. Under AEDPA, the Secretary of State notifies leaders in Congress and gives
notice to designees in the Federal Register. AEDPA § 302(a)(2)(A) (codifed as 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189(a)(2)(A)). FTOs then have 30 days to challenge their designation in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Court. § 302(b). Such cases, usually
based on allegations of an abuse of discretion by the State Department or a lack of
substantial support for the FTO designation, are largely unsuccessful. E.g., People’s
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (uphold
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Because the consequences of FTO designation can be severe, in
cluding the ability of financial intuitions to block or freeze assets of
an FTO,78 the barring of FTOs from entry into the United States,79
and potential material support charges,80 the procedural safeguards
are even more important.81 FTO designation carries with it
mandatory review and renewal process for the Secretary of State.82
B. Challenges to Proscriptions and Listings
Another such safeguard in the FTO designation process is the
opportunity to contest the designation proposed by the State Depart
ment. This layer of judicial review protects against arbitrariness in
the designation,83 and requires some disclosure of the basis upon
which the State Department made its determination.84
Designated groups may challenge their designations by seeking
judicial review before the D.C. Circuit Court within thirty days of the
designation being published in the Federal Register. The court may
rely only on the administrative record generated by the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of State may supplement this record on an ex
parte basis with classified information used in making the designa
tion.85 The D.C. Circuit has the right to reverse if the designation is
found to be not in accord with the procedures required by law. The
FTO designation remains in force until it is revoked by either judicial
or administrative review. In either case, the burden lies with the
FTO to challenge its designation.
ing FTO designation based on classified evidence and emphasizing deference to the
State Department in the FTO designation process).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2) (2006).
79. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V) (2006).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). The constitutionality of the FTO designation
process authorized by Executive Order No. 13,224 and various statutes was upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder. Holder v. Humanita
rian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
81. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 196
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing the severe impact of FTO designation).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(C), (a)(6) (2006). If no review has been made of an FTO
designation for five years, the Secretary of State must review the listing to determine
whether it should be revoked due to a change in the organization’s mission and ac
tions, or a change in the national security assessment by the United States. See id.
83. Under the AEDPA, courts have the power to set aside the State Department
designation of an FTO if it is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or if it
is not based on substantial evidence. AEDPA § 302(b)(3) (codified as 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189(c)(3)). Courts have, however, been extremely deferential to the State Depart
ment, choosing not to review classified evidence in some instances, but relying instead
on State Department affirmations of substantial evidence to support its designation
decision. E.g., People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 327 F.3d at 1244.
84. E.g., People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. United States Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d
220, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the government had violated due process by
failing to give an FTO the opportunity to view unclassified evidence prior to making a
final decision denying petition to revoke designation as an FTO).
85. See Said, Material Support Prosecution, supra note 74, at 559.
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TERRORISM FINANCING

A. The Regulatory Regime to Counter Terrorism Financing
Executive Order 13224 was signed by President George W. Bush
in September 2001 with the stated purpose of disrupting and destroy
ing financial support for al-Qaeda.86 A number of policies designed to
minimize and disrupt terrorist financing have become important
tools in U.S. counterterrorism strategy. These policies are imple
mented largely by the Treasury Department,87 with support from the
State Department and Justice Department. The Office of Intelligence
and Analysis (OIA) within Treasury Department was created in
2004, making the Treasury Department the only finance ministry in
the world with its own in-house intelligence unit. Separately, Trea
sury Department’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
(TFI) members chair the U.S. delegation to the Financial Action Task
Force, an intergovernmental body that develops and promotes poli
cies to combat illicit finance.88
Title III of the Patriot Act amended the Bank Secrecy Act to re
quire certain financial institutions and businesses to establish antimoney laundering programs .89 The government also sought to en
courage transparency, good corporate governance and strong antimoney laundering programs through suggesting that public and me
dia attention will cause social stigma to attach to businesses that
engage with entities that are associated with criminal or terrorist ac
tivity.90 U.S. authorities have prioritized the investigation and
disruption of funding to non-profit organizations, and have used the
material support statutes as an effective, if highly controversial, tool
to hinder the ability of terrorist groups to maintain their finances.
The robust use of material support statutes has caused such solicita
tion to wither or, in some cases, go further underground.91
The Department of Justice is the principal government entity re
sponsible for overseeing the investigation and prosecution of money
86. Executive Order 13224 of Sept. 23, 2001: Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism
(citing both domestic authority and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UN
SCR) 1214, UNSCR 1267, UNSCR 1333, and UNSCR 1363 as supportive authority).
87. The Treasury Department’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
(TFI) coordinates these efforts. The TFI consists of four sub-groups: the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC),
the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC), and the Office of In
telligence and Analysis (OIA). Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money
Laundering And Combating The Financing of Terrorism: United States of America,
(Financial Action Task Force, Paris, France) June 2006, at 15-16 [hereinafter June
2006 Financing Report] available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/u-z/united
states/documents/mutualevaluationoftheunitedstates.html.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id. at 8.
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laundering and terrorist financing offenses at the federal level,
whereas the State Department represents the U.S. government in
several multilateral institutions, including those exercising sanctions
related to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267 and Counter-Ter
rorism Committees.92
The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterter
rorism leads its efforts to designate FTOs in order to freeze assets
and preparing Executive Order 13224 designations to block assets
and prohibit contributions of terrorists and terrorist organizations.93
B. Criminal Offences of Terrorism Financing
The issues of what standards of knowledge and intent are neces
sary to sustain a conviction for material support of terrorism have
been extensively litigated. The 2010 Supreme Court decision in
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project affirmed the constitutionality of
the material support statute, thereby upholding the congressional in
tent to criminalize almost all support to FTOs, even if the funds were
earmarked for humanitarian—not terrorism—purposes.94
The four federal offenses deal directly with financing of terrorism
or terrorist organizations and criminalize the provision of material
support for the commission of certain offenses,95 provision of material
support or resources to designated FTOs,96 provision or collection of
terrorist funds,97 and the concealment or disguise of either material
support to FTOs or funds used or to be used for terrorist acts.98
VII. IMMIGRATION MEASURES
Immigration Detention
The government is authorized to detain any person for whom it
has certified that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the person
has engaged in espionage,99 opposition by violence,100 or terrorist ac
tivity,101 or is involved with an organization that is suspected of
92. Id. at 17.
93. Id. at 19.
94. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
95. 18 USC 2339A (enacted in 1994, effective in 1996).
96. 18 USC 2339B (enacted by Congress and signed by the President in April
1996, and implemented with State Department designations of FTOs on Oct. 81997).
97. 18 USC 2339C(a) (enacted 25 June 2002).
98. 18 USC 2339C(c) (enacted 25 June 2002).
99. Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) §237(a)(4)(A)(i) (authorizing de
tention for those suspected of engaging in espionage, sabotage, or export control).
100. INA §237 (a)(4)(A)(iii) (authorizing detention for those expressing opposition
by violence or overthrow of the U.S. government).
101. INA §212(a)(4)(B) (authorizing detention for those suspected of terrorist activ
ity); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(III) and (iv)(I) (authorizing removal of those indicating
an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm or have incited terrorist activity); 8

\\jciprod01\productn\C\COM\62-S\COMS10.txt

2014]

unknown

Seq: 17

COUNTRY REPORT ON COUNTERTERRORISM

30-JUN-14

14:23

659

terrorist activity.102 The Attorney General may detain the suspect for
up to seven days prior to placing the suspect in removal proceedings
or charging him or her criminally.103 If the suspect is not placed in
removal proceedings or criminally charged, the Attorney General
must release him or her, but if placed in proceedings, the Attorney
General must detain the person even if he or she is eligible for relief
or obtains relief until the Attorney General determines that there is
no longer any reason to believe that the person falls under one of the
bases for certification.104 The Attorney General is obligated to review
the certification subjecting the person to mandatory detention every
six months and the detainee may request review every six months
and may submit documents and other evidence in support of his or
her request.105 A detainee who has been ordered removed, but whose
removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may be de
tained for additional six month periods only if the government
believes that release will threaten national security or the safety of
the community or any person.106
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has relied
heavily on immigration law and policy to detain, interrogate, control
and remove suspected terrorists.107 With fewer checks and balances,
it is much easier for the government to arrest, detain, and investigate
an individual under immigration law than criminal law. Unlike the
U.S. criminal justice system, where defendants have the right to an
attorney, the right to a speedy trial, and the presumption of inno
cence until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, immigration
law does not afford detainees ample protections. For example, a
noncitizen is permitted to have an attorney in immigration proceed
ings, but counsel is not provided for the 80% of detainees in removal
proceedings who are indigent. Furthermore, a non-citizen can be
mandatorily detained for months, or even years, before being re
leased or removed from the United States, and the standard for
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI) (making inadmissible aliens who endorse or espouse ter
rorist activity or persuade others to endorse or espouse terrorist activity).
102. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) or (III). See also U.S. CTC Response 2006,
supra note 17, at 8 (noting that “if a group is designated or treated as a terrorist
organization for immigration purposes, aliens having certain associations with the
group (including persons who knowingly provide material support to the group) be
come inadmissible to and deportable from the United States”).
103. INA §236(a)(5).
104. INA §§236(a)(2), (5).
105. INA §236A (a)(7).
106. INA §236A (a)(6).
107. In 2009, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had over 1.6 million
aliens in its scope of monitoring: in ICE detention centers, in other jails or prisons, or
under a released monitoring system. See Department of Homeland Security Office of
the Inspector General, Supervision of Aliens Commensurate With Risk, OIG 11-81
(Dec. 2011) (hereinafter DHS 2011 IG Report), at 3.
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removal is that of “clear and convincing evidence,” a much lower
standard than that of reasonable doubt.108
These lesser protections have allowed federal officials to under
take several initiatives that have targeted immigrants, primarily
those from Muslim-majority countries, in the name of national secur
ity. Muslims in the immigration system have been subjected to
possibly abusive109 preventive detention,110 exclusion based on politi
cal views, heightened surveillance and arguably unconstitutional
racial profiling.111 Detainees in the immigration system face serious
hurdles in challenging the government’s case for removal due to the
lower removal standard of “clear and convincing evidence” as well as
the inability to access and challenge the secret evidence presented
and alleged by the government.112
The government has, to some extent, conflated immigration and
counterterrorism programs and has encouraged use of the immigra
tion system as an important tool in counterterrorism efforts.113 The
result has been a system that, although legal under U.S. law,114 ar
guably violates international law and norms with regard to the
treatment of migrants.115
108. INA §240(c)(3)(A).
109. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667-69 (2009).
110. Another category of detained aliens are those subject to an additional inter
agency screening called Third Agency Check. This system to screen aliens in ICE
custody who are from specially designated countries (SDCs) that have “shown a ten
dency to promote, produce, or protect terrorist organizations or their members.” See
DHS 2011 IG Report, supra note 105, at 5. The SDC list is largely comprised of major
ity Muslim nations. See ICE List of Specially Designated Countries (SDCs) that
Promote or Protect Terrorism, publicintelligence.net, July 2, 2011, available at http://
publicintelligence.net/specially-designated-countries/ (listing the SDCs that were
originally part of the DHS 2011 IG Report, but which were subsequently removed
from that publication).
111. See Under the Radar, supra note 50, at 4 (discussing various programs target
ing non-citizens, including Absconder Apprehension Initiative, NSEERS special
registration policy, and Operation Frontline). Another controversial immigration po
licing program is Secure Communities, which requires state and local police to send
fingerprints of arrestees to ICE so that undocumented immigrants can be identified
and possibly detained, prosecuted and removed. See Immigration and Customs En
forcement, Secure Communities, ice.gov (describing the Secure Communities
program), available at http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (visited Sept. 13,
2013).
112. See Under the Radar, supra note 50, at 4.
113. See, e.g., Attorney General John Ashcroft and INS Commissioner Jim Ziglar,
Announcement of INS Restructuring Plan (November 14, 2001), available at http://
www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks11_14.htm (“The INS will
also be an important part of our effort to prevent aliens who engage in or support
terrorist activity from entering our country.”).
114. See DHS 2011 IG Report, supra note 107, at 1 (noting that immigration au
thorities had generally complied with applicable domestic laws).
115. See Under the Radar, supra note 50, at 18 (citing the conclusion of the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants that U.S. immigration enforcement pol
icies violate international laws that bar arbitrary detention).
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VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE/EXECUTIVE MEASURES
The AUMF and Patriot Act cemented the government’s authority
to determine whether information was too sensitive to disclose and
then punish those who disclosed such information.116 More recently,
Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012,
which empowered the President to take extraordinary national secur
ity measures unilaterally and enabled further non-disclosure of
information by the administration and military.117
One area in which the tensions between secret, unilateral execu
tive action and the desire for a public, multi-branch course of action
has been most prominent is that of targeted killings. The U.S. use of
unmanned aerial vehicles (“drones”) for targeted killings118 of sus
pected terrorists has expanded significantly since President Obama
took office in 2009.119 The Obama administration has consistently
emphasized the necessity, efficacy and legality of targeted killings.
However, the program has prompted much debate over its exis
tence,120 the moral calculus121 and legal parameters and authorities
for such a program,122 and specific questions regarding the legality of
116. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272 (codi
fied in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.) (disallowing the dissemination of information
regarding any business records that are sought pursuant to terrorism investigations);
id. § 223 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (permitting civil liability and
administrative disciplinary measures against individuals who make unauthorized
disclosures of information); id. § 116 (prohibiting disclosure to individuals involved in
suspicious activities that such activity was reported pursuant to the issuance of a
National Security Letter).
117. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–81,
§1025 (2011) (limiting the types of information, forms of communication, and repre
sentation available to detainees).
118. Although targeted killings is not defined under international law, it is often
considered to encompass “premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in
times of peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their
custody.” See Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, Council on Foreign Relations,
May 23, 2013, available at http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/
p9627 (visited July 18, 2013). Although the governments that utilize targeted killings
differentiate them from assassinations, see Harold Hongju Koh, The Obama Adminis
tration and International Law, Mar. 25, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/
releases/remarks/139119.htm, critics view them as similar actions in terms of illegal
ity. See, e.g., Complaint, Al-Aulaqi, et al. v. Panetta, at ¶1, Case 1:12-cv-01192-RMC
(D.D.C. July 18, 2012).
119. See New America Foundation, Drone Database, available at http://natsec.
newamerica.net/about (visited July 18, 2013) (detailing the number of drone strikes
by the United States in Yemen and Pakistan since 2004).
120. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, sum
mary or arbitrary executions: Study on Targeted Killings, A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, May
28, 2010 (questioning the legality of the CIA drone program).
121. See generally Samuel Isaacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Drones and the Di
lemma of Modern Warfare, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2268596 (visited
July 31, 2013) (theorizing the moral dilemma of drone use in the context of warfare in
which geographic and other traditional boundaries of violence are distorted).
122. See Alston, supra note 118, at Add.6, May 28, 2010 (discussing international
law of war principles with regard to targeted killings); e.g., Eric Holder, Attorney Gen
eral Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law, Mar. 5, 2012,

\\jciprod01\productn\C\COM\62-S\COMS10.txt

662

unknown

Seq: 20

30-JUN-14

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

14:23

[Vol. 62

its scope in terms of geographic location of the target and citizenship
of the target.123 The parameters and future of the targeted killings
program should be considered in the context of two Obama adminis
tration positions as to the nature of the battle being fought: first, the
assertion that the theater of war for U.S. counterterrorism efforts is
not restricted geographically and, therefore, encompasses the entire
globe;124 and second, statements made by administration officials in
early 2013 that although the country should not remain on a war
footing permanently, current counterterrorism efforts will likely last
another ten to twenty years.125
The parameters of the targeted killing program remain largely
shielded from public view, with limited information disclosed during
President Obama’s first term126 and the leak of a classified Depart
ment of Justice memorandum detailing some of the legal bases for
the program.127 In early 2012, Attorney General Holder’s public
statement on drone use made clear that the administration was not
bound geographically, that U.S. citizenship was no protection against
being included on the list of targets for a drone strike, and that no
judicial process was constitutionally necessary to target U.S. citizens
so long as the administration followed its own careful procedures of
determining whether to target a citizen.128
In May 2013, President Obama gave his second129 major na
tional security policy speech, discussing a number of national
security and foreign policy priorities, but focusing in large part on the
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html
(outlining the parameters used by the Obama administration to determine whether a
targeted killing comports with international and domestic legal obligations).
123. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing, based
on standing grounds, the suit of Nasser al-Aulaqi to enjoin the U.S. government from
keeping his son, U.S. citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi, on its targeted killing list).
124. Spencer Ackerman, Spec Ops Chief Sees ‘10 to 20 Years’ More for War Against
al-Qaida, wired.com, May 16, 2013, available at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/
2013/05/decades-of-war/ (visited July 18, 2013) (discussing the Senate testimony of
Michael Sheehan, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and lowintensity conflict, with regard to the global theater of war).
125. Id. (relating the Senate testimony of Michael Sheehan, the assistant secretary
of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, with regard to the proba
ble duration of the U.S. counterterrorism effort against al-Qaida).
126. E.g., John O. Brennan, Remarks of John O. Brennan: Strengthening our Se
curity by Adhering to our Values and Laws, Sept. 16, 2011, available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening
our-security-adhering-our-values-an (visited July 24, 2013); Koh, supra note 116.
127. Department of Justice White Paper, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Di
rected Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An
Associated Force, available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/02
0413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (visited July 24, 2013) [hereinafter DOJ White Paper].
128. See Holder, supra note 120.
129. President Obama gave his first major speech on national security in 2009. See
Remarks by the President on National Security, May 21, 2009, available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09
(hereinafter “2009 National Archives Speech”).
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parameters of the administration’s targeted killing program.130 In it,
he argued that the use of drones to kill suspected terrorists is effec
tive, legal and necessary, yet also acknowledged legal, foreign policy
and political constraints on the program.131 Some critics were disap
pointed that the speech did not place additional meaningful limits on
the president’s authority to use drones, and that the president’s
promises of transparency and adequate oversight were unsupported
by specific details or plans.132
IX. ROLE

OF

MILITARY AND EXTRA-TERRITORIAL COUNTER
TERRORISM ACTIVITIES

A. Military Courts and Detention
The Bush administration decided immediately after the Septem
ber 11 attacks to detain suspected terrorists as unlawful enemy
combatants—often at the U.S. military facility in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba—and to try them, if at all, before a military commission.133
Such detention would not necessarily comport with international
standards, and any commissions would be administered by the execu
tive branch and would not necessarily include the protections
mandated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the courts mar
tial system.134

130. Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, May 23, 2013,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-presi
dent-national-defense-university (hereinafter “May 2013 NDU Speech”).
131. Id.
132. E.g., Glenn Greenwald, Obama’s speech: seeing what you want to see, theguar
dian.com, May 27, 2013, available at Fred Kaplan, Obama’s Post-9/11 World, slate.
com, May 23, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
may/27/obama-war-on-terror-speech (visited August 12, 2013) (arguing that Presi
dent Obama’s speech was mostly rhetoric meant to appease critics from a variety of
political perspectives); http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/
2013/05/barack_obama_national_defense_university_speech_nothing_new_about_
drones.html (visited July 18, 2013) (noting that President Obama’s speech outlined
limits that were almost identical to those already in place and that the Justice De
partment had defined those limitations in ways that rendered the restrictions
“meaningless”). Some politically conservative critics asserted that President Obama’s
speech consisted largely of rhetoric to appease liberal voters concerned about the ad
ministration’s use of drones, but that Obama’s substantive policy and approach to
executive power was similar to that of President George W. Bush. See, e.g., Benjamin
Wittes, The President’s Speech: A Quick and Dirty Reaction—Part 1 (Are We At War?),
Lawfare Blog, May 23, 2013, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/the
presidents-speech-a-quick-and-dirty-reaction-part-1/.
133. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
134. See Setty, Specialized Trials, supra note 31, at 142-43 (discussing the ways in
which the procedural protections offered to detainees in the military commission sys
tem deviated from the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
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Detention at the Guantánamo Bay Facility
In designating the Guantánamo Bay, Cuba military facility135 to
hold detainees, the Bush Administration made an overt choice to seek
to evade the domestic legal protections that would run to detainees
held on U.S. soil,136 including access to habeas corpus hearings.137
The government further denied the applicability of international
human rights and humanitarian norms and international law more
generally, as applied to the detainees held at Guantánamo.138 When
the Supreme Court held that the U.S. habeas corpus statute encom
passed the indefinite detention of detainees at Guantánamo,139 the
administration convinced Congress to amend that statute to deny all
detainees the right to habeas corpus, even those who had already
filed claims in court.140 In the 2008 Boumediene v. Bush decision, the
Supreme Court ruled that Congress and the President could not de
cide that detainees at Guantánamo had no access to the law.141 Since
then, most captured detainees have been taken to other locations,
such as the Bagram Air Force base in Afghanistan, where courts
have held that detainees have no habeas rights.142
Since 2002, 779 men have been taken to the naval base in Guan
tánamo Bay, Cuba,143 and 155 remained there as of February
2014.144 There have been consistent reports of widespread abuse, tor
ture, and violations of the prisoners’ human rights.145 Almost twothirds of the prisoners joined a months-long hunger strike in 2013,
135. For a thoughtful and detailed assessment of the role of the Guantánamo Bay
military facility in U.S. history and foreign policy, see Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez,
Guantánamo as Outside and Inside the U.S.: Why is a Base a Legal Anomaly?, 18 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 471 (2010).
136. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 497-98 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. David Cole, The Taint of Torture: the Roles of Law and Policy in Our Descent
to the Dark Side, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 53, 65 (2012).
138. See Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, “Protected Person”
Status in Occupied Iraq Under the Fourth Geneva Convention 23 (Mar. 18, 2004),
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2004/gc4mar18.pdf).
139. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
140. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §7, 120 Stat.
2600, 2635-36 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §2241(e) (1) (2006)).
141. See Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (“The Constitution grants
Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not
the power to decide when and where its terms apply.”).
142. See Al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
´
143. AMNESTY INT’L, USA: ‘I AM FALLEN INTO DARKNESS’. OBAIDULLAH, GUANTANAMO
DETAINEE IN HIS 12TH YEAR WITHOUT TRIAL 1 (2013) available at http://www.amnesty
usa.org/sites/default/files/amr510512013en.pdf.
144. See Human Rights Watch, Facts and Figures: Military Commissions v. Fed
eral Courts, available at http://www.hrw.org/features/guantanamo-facts-figures
(visited Feb. 26, 2014).
145. See, e.g., CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, REPORT ON TORTURE AND CRUEL,
´
BAY, CUBA
INHUMANE, AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AT GUANTANAMO
(2006) available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report_ReportOnTorture.pdf.
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which led to military resorting to force-feeding several prisoners.146
Federal district courts declined to intervene on behalf of the prison
ers, despite widespread condemnation by the United Nations and
international human rights groups that the force-feeding constitutes
torture.147 The government changed its policy in December 2013 such
that it will no longer disclose to the public whether detainees are par
ticipating in hunger strikes.148 President Obama recommitted to
closing the Guantánamo Bay in May 2013,149 after failing to fulfill
the promise to do so when he took office in 2009.150
Access to Justice
The United States Supreme Court, in a series of cases from 2004
to 2008,151 found various aspects of the administration’s detention
and military commission model to be unconstitutional. However, the
Supreme Court consistently found that the use of military commis
sions instead of the ordinary criminal justice system was
constitutionally acceptable.152
Supreme Court jurisprudence set a minimum guarantee of con
stitutional rights to be available to detainees, such as that of habeas
corpus, but curtailing certain procedural and substantive protections
in a military commission system is acceptable.153 After initially sug
146. Ann E. Marimow, Judge Rejects Request to Block Force-feeding of Guanta
namo Bay Detainees, WASH. POST (July 16, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2013-07-16/national/40606715_1_hunger-strike-detainees-force-feeding.
147. See United Nations Human Rights, IACHR, UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, UN Rapporteur on Torture, UN Rapporteur on Human Rights and
Counter-Terrorism, and UN Rapporteur on Health reiterate need to end the indefinite
detention of individuals at Guatánamo Naval Base in light of current human rights
crisis, May 1, 2013, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display
News.aspx?NewsID=13278&LangID=E (decrying the force-feeding of the detainees as
contrary to international law).
148. See Carol Rosenberg, Military imposes blackout on Guantánamo hunger-strike
figures, miamiherald.com, Dec. 3, 2013, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/
2013/12/03/3795285/guantanamo-ends-daily-hunger-strike.html (visited Feb. 26,
2014).
149. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National De
fense University (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
150. See President Barack Obama, Closure Of Guantanamo Detention Facilities
(Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ClosureOf
GuantanamoDetentionFacilities (visited Sept. 22, 2013).
151. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (demanding improved procedu
ral protections for detainees to comport with constitutional due process
requirements); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (demanding congressional
authorization for military commissions); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004)
(finding the lack of due process protections in the military commission system to be
unconstitutional).
152. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (acknowledging “the possi
bility that the [due process] standards [the Supreme Court] ha[s] articulated could be
met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal”); see
also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (same).
153. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538.
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gesting that military commissions were not necessary to try
detainees, President Obama in 2009 revived the military commission
system,154 citing the long history of their use and military neces
sity.155 A July 2009 protocol noted that detainees are entitled to the
presumption of trial in an ordinary criminal court, but numerous ob
jective and subjective factors could warrant a change in venue,
including strength of interest, efficiency, and “other prosecution con
siderations” such as the available sentence and the ability to use
certain evidence in a given forum.156
Under the Military Commissions Act of 2009, evidence from tor
ture or cruel, inhuman or degrading interrogations is disallowed, the
use of hearsay is limited, defendants are granted greater latitude in
selecting their counsel, and protections against self-incrimination
were instituted.157 Nonetheless, significant deviations exist among
the military commissions, the courts-martial system, and ordinary
criminal courts. Defendants in military commissions are guaranteed
neither the right to remain silent or the right to the exclusion of their
previous coerced statements,158 nor the right to a speedy trial.159
Trial for ex post facto crimes is permissible in a military commis
sion.160 Guilty verdicts in non-capital cases can be rendered by twothirds of the jury.161 Hearsay evidence is more easily admissible and
access to classified information is significantly curtailed.162 The con
troversial and problematic curtailing of these due process protections
154. See David E. Sanger, Obama After Bush: Leading by Second Thought, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2009, at A3 (discussing President Obama’s changing stance on the
utility of military commissions).
155. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement of
President Barack Obama on Military Commissions (May 15, 2009), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-of-President-Barack-Obama-on-MilitaryCommissions/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
156. See Department of Defense & Department of Justice Protocol, Determination
of Guantanamo Cases Referred for Prosecution, at ¶2 (July 20, 2009).
157. See Jennifer K. Elsea, Comparison of Rights in Military Commission Trials
and Trials in Federal Criminal Court, Congressional Research Service, Feb. 28, 2013,
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40932.pdf (offering a detailed compar
ison of the rights guaranteed under the Military Commissions Act of 2009 and those
offered in ordinary criminal courts).
158. Compare Military Commissions Act § 949a(b)(2)(c) with Unif. Code of Military
Justice, art. 31, §§ (a), (b), & (d) (guaranteeing freedom from self-incrimination, and
which are specifically made inapplicable to military commissions) and U.S. Const.,
amend. V (guaranteeing freedom from self-incrimination).
159. Military Commissions Act § 949a. A speedy trial is guaranteed in both Article
III courts and courts martial. U.S. Const., amend. VI (giving the right to a speedy
trial); 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(2) (2008) (mandating commencement of trials within sev
enty days of indictment or original appearance in court). Unif. Code of Military
Justice, art. 10.
160. Military Commissions Act §§ 948d, 950p. Cf. U.S. Const., art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 (“No
ex post facto law shall be passed.”).
161. Military Commissions Act § 949m. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 31 (requiring unani
mous jury verdicts for conviction).
162. Military Commissions Act §§ 949a(b)(3)(D), 949p-1- 949p-7.
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is further compounded by the Obama administration’s reservation of
the right to continue to imprison anyone acquitted under the military
commission system if security interests suggest that continued deten
tion is necessary.163
A number of military commission trials have taken place at the
Guantánamo Bay detention facility,164 despite critiques that the tri
als are both unnecessary given the availability of ordinary criminal
courts and the courts-martial system and fundamentally unfair, and
despite irregularities and setbacks. For example, Omar Khadr was
first detained in 2002 at the age of fifteen, subjected to problematic
interrogation, and eventually pled guilty to various terrorism-related
charges.165 Salim Hamdan, a driver to Osama bin Laden, was con
victed of conspiracy in a military commission, a charge that was
overturned by an appellate court in 2012 based on the fact that con
spiracy was not considered a war crime at the time that Hamdan was
detained.166
Torture and Accountability
The United States has long been party to international treaties
prohibiting torture as well as cruel, degrading, and inhuman treat
ment. Among them are the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,167 the Geneva Conventions,168 the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,169 the American Convention on Human
Rights,170 and the Convention Against Torture.171 On the domestic
level, the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Con
163. Jess Bravin, Detainees, Even if Acquitted, Might Not Go Free, Wall St. J.
(July 8, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124699680303307309.html (last visited
September 21, 2013).
164. See Military Commissions Cases, Office of Military Commissions, available at
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (visited Sept. 21, 2013).
165. See Charlie Savage, Deal Averts Trial in Disputed Guantánamo Case, ny
times.com, Oct. 25, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/us/26
gitmo.html (visited Sept. 21, 2013).
166. See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
167. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810,
at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948).
168. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Con
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
169. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
170. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978), reprinted in Basic Documents Per
taining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6
rev.1 at 25 (1992).
171. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat
ment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26,
1987) (“Convention Against Torture”).
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stitution have been interpreted as prohibiting torture,172 and various
domestic laws codify the obligations in the Convention Against Tor
ture: the federal Torture Statute,173 the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991,174 the Alien Tort Claims Act,175 and the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998.176
In late 2003, evidence surfaced of abuse and torture of detainees
held at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, at the hands of members of the
U.S. military.177 Similar reports surfaced from the detention facility
at Guantánamo Bay.178 Memos prepared by the Office of Legal Coun
sel in 2002 and 2003 advised the President and the military that
detainees who were suspected members of Al Qaeda were not pro
tected by international and domestic prohibitions against torture
and, furthermore, that abuse of detainees would not constitute “tor
ture” unless the interrogators intended to cause the type of pain
associated with death or organ failure.179 Those memos were subse
quently rescinded, and several members of the military were
convicted at courts-martial for detainee abuse.180 Congress subse
quently cemented the U.S. prohibition of the abuse and torture of
detainees with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.181
In 2009, President Obama signed an executive order banning the
use of enhanced interrogation techniques and limiting interrogation
techniques to those permitted in the Army Field Manual.182 Such
limitations were reinforced with the Military Commissions Act of
2009.183 Despite his campaign rhetoric on the need for a full account
172. See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitu
tional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278 (2003).
173. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (2006)).
174. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codi
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)).
175. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
176. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
§ 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006)).
177. Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER (May 10, 2004)
available at www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact.
178. See, e.g., CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, REPORT ON TORTURE AND CRUEL,
´
BAY, CUBA
INHUMANE, AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AT GUANTANAMO
(2006) available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Report_ReportOnTorture.pdf.
179. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S.
Bybee, Asst. Atty. General, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Asst. Atty. General,
regarding Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A
(Aug. 1, 2002).
180. Scott Shane, David Johnston and James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of
Severe Interrogation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/04/washington/04interrogate.html?pagewanted=all.
181. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148 §§ 1001-06, 119 Stat.
2739 (codified at 42 U.S.C § 2000dd (2006)).
182. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
183. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190,
2608 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950t(11)).
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ing of torture, President Obama has not pursued prosecution and has
precluded a full investigation of those who created the policies that
arguably allowed torture to occur.184
Non-refoulement
The non-refoulement obligation in Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture185 applies to U.S. extraordinary rendition practices
and the movement of detainees from the Guantánamo detention facil
ity. With regard to the former, when Canadian-Syrian dual citizen
Maher Arar was rendered to Syria, the U.S. was obligated to seek
assurances that he would not be mistreated there. However, evidence
suggests that Arar was subjected to prolonged abuse and torture by
his captors in Syria.186 With regard to Guantánamo, several detain
ees have been cleared for release, but under the obligation of non
refoulement, the U.S. continues to hold them because of fear of tor
ture upon return to their countries of citizenship.187
B. Extra-Territorial Terrorism Law Enforcement
Since the attacks of September 11, extraordinary rendition has
been used to capture over 100 suspected terrorists in foreign coun
tries and remove them to other nations for interrogation and control
purposes. Some such detainees suffered extreme abuse and torture at
the hands of their interrogators.188 Several have brought suits in
U.S. courts seeking compensation for their treatment. Despite sub
stantial evidence that citizens of Canada,189 Germany190 and the
United Kingdom,191 among others, were rendered by the U. S. gov
ernment to other nations and were subsequently abused by the
184. Scott Shane, No Charges Filed on Harsh Tactics Used by the C.I.A, nytimes.
com, Aug. 30, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/us/holder-rules
out-prosecutions-in-cia-interrogations.html?pagewanted=all (visited Sept. 27, 2013).
185. Convention Against Torture, supra note 168, Art. 3.
186. See Human Rights Watch, Torture and Non-Refoulement, Jan. 29, 2004, avail
able at http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/01/28/torture-and-non-refoulement (detailing
Arar’s situation).
187. International Committee of the Red Cross, Persons detained by the US in rela
tion to armed conflict and counter-terrorism—the role of the ICRC, June 18, 2013
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/united-states-detention.htm.
188. See Amrit Singh, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordi
nary Rendition, Open Society Foundations, at 13-15 (2013) (describing the history and
use of extraordinary rendition).
189. See Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation
to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommen
dations (2006). See also Kent Roach, Review and Oversight of National Security
Activities and Some Reflections on Canada’s Arar Inquiry, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 53
(2008).
190. See JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 282-87 (2008) (detailing Khalid El-Masri’s
plight).
191. See Sudha Setty, Judicial Formalism and the State Secrets Privilege, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1630, 1634-35 (2012) (detailing the claims of Binyam Mohamed).
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security forces in the nations to which they were rendered, all such
suits have been dismissed on procedural bases.192
In 2009 the Obama administration created a task force to study
the practice of extraordinary rendition with the aim of ensuring com
pliance with domestic and international human rights standards and
legal norms.193 Renditions are believed to be continuing under this
articulated standard.194
X.

SECRECY

AND

TERRORISM

A. Secrecy Claims and Secret Evidence
The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) is a 1980 law
that established procedures for the use of classified and secret infor
mation in criminal trials.195 CIPA outlines a comprehensive set of
procedures for the treatment of evidence in criminal cases that impli
cate classified information or rely on evidence that is classified. For
example, CIPA allows the government, under limited circumstances,
to substitute unclassified summaries of classified evidence.196 The
Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush acknowledged the need to
deal with classified information in a sensitive and thoughtful man
ner, and expressed confidence that ordinary criminal courts would be
able to manage the task successfully.197
B. Secrecy in the Courtroom and Anonymous Witnesses: Secret and
Classified Evidence in Civil Suits
The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege
that enables the government to prevent disclosure of sensitive state
secrets in the course of litigation. The claim of privilege by the gov
ernment, if upheld by a court, can result in consequences ranging
from the denial of a discovery request for a particular document to
the outright dismissal of a suit. Although a balancing test for assess
ing claims of privilege was established in the 1950s,198 a meaningful
assessment has often been precluded by the judicial tendency to up
hold claims of privilege without engaging in a substantial analysis of
192. E.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1092–93 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3409 (2010); El-Masri v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d ,
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007).
193. See Executive Order 13,491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations at § (5)(e)(ii)
(Jan. 22, 2009).
194. See David Johnston, U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, But With More Over
sight, nytimes.com, Aug. 24, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/
us/politics/25rendition.html?_r=0 (visited Sept. 22, 2013).
195. Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-456,94 Stat
2025.
196. Id. at 6.
197. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008).
198. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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the underlying evidence or of the government’s claimed need for non
disclosure.199 In 2009, the Obama administration promised to reform
the use of the state secrets privilege to allow for greater government
accountability.200 However, the administration’s continued aggres
sive use of the privilege, seeking and winning dismissal of suits
alleging serious government abuse such as torture,201 suggests only
continuity in the use of the privilege to prevent meaningful accounta
bility through civil suits.
XI. CONCLUSION: ASSESSMENT

OF

U.S. ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS

In the last four years, U.S. counterterrorism policy has shifted in
some significant ways, such as ending the use of abusive interroga
tion practices and accepting that international law applies to U.S.
counterterrorism practices. However, the continuity between the
Bush and Obama administrations in the substance of many
counterterrorism programs, the assertion of high levels of presiden
tial power and the continued high level of secrecy has created a
bipartisan imprimatur of the robust counterterrorism programs that
exist today, as well as the many problematic aspects of those pro
grams. Congress, the judiciary and the public, all grateful that no
large-scale terrorist attacks have occurred since 2001 and cognizant
that threats still exist, have been largely acquiescent despite signifi
cant costs to human rights and civil liberties in the form of racial and
religious profiling, indefinite detention, expansive and seemingly
poorly controlled surveillance, extrajudicial killings, and torture and
other abuses for which there has been a pronounced lack of
accountability.
The government’s aggressive counterterrorism stance has influ
enced actions and policies outside of the U.S. federal government: the
work of domestic local and state-level law enforcement has been al
tered through federal programs mandating vertical informationsharing and coordination; the U.S. has exerted significant influence
on the United Nations Security Council in shaping and promoting
resolutions that have had a worldwide impact on counterterrorism
programs; and the U.S. has exerted its soft power to attempt to influ
ence other nations to shape their own counterterrorism policies in
199. See Setty, supra note 191.
200. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., on Policies and Proce
dures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts &
Agencies (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/ag-memo
re-state-secrets-dated-09-22-09.pdf (establishing layers of internal review within the
Department of Justice and including a new executive branch policy to report to Con
gress any invocations of the state secrets privilege).
201. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(dismissing a suit seeking compensation for extraordinary rendition and torture
based on the government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege).
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ways that promote U.S. interests.202 Furthermore, the U.S. stance on
issues like foreign surveillance and the use of drones for targeted kill
ings in areas that are not active theaters of war has set a dangerous
precedent with regard to other nations attempting to develop and use
the same technology.203 It may be that the muscular stance of the
U.S. on such issues will promote a similar response in other nations
as their technology and power develops.
Future challenges for U.S. counterterrorism law are manifold.
The driving imperative will continue to be recognizing and con
fronting continuing threats posed by al-Qaeda, other foreign terrorist
groups, domestic terrorism and cyberterrorism. However, the U.S.
would do well to improve its transparency and accountability mecha
nisms to comport with the rule of law and maintain democratic
values. Such initiatives are unlikely to stem from the executive
branch, which means that the judiciary, Congress, and the public
must engage more fully to insist upon open debate, accountability
and further oversight and constraint.
The U.S. response to terrorism has been multifaceted and expan
sive, reflective of the U.S. role in global security, and is an ongoing
work in progress. Branches of the federal government and the public
question and redefine their obligations and roles in upholding secur
ity while safeguarding the rule of law, and the debate over the
appropriate course of action on these matters will no doubt continue
for the foreseeable future.

202. See, e.g., Setty, supra note 191, at 1643-45, 1652-53.
203. See, e.g., Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange, China Has Drones. Now
What?, foreignaffairs.com, May 23, 2013, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/139405/andrew-erickson-and-austin-strange/china-has-drones-now-what
(raising questions as to how China will deploy its military drone capability).

